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HAS THE ONTOLOGY OF MUSIC
RESTED ON A MISTAKE?
Stefano Predelli
T HF. I.AST T\'(:O decades have witnessed a lively debate concerningthe ontological status of musical works. Philosophers and music-
ologists have defended a variety of contrasting views on this topic,
and the discussion of the merits and drawbacks of the rival
hypotheses still occupies a central place in the controversy on the
metaphysics of artworks. To a large extent, however, the parties
involved in the dispute share an important philosophical assumption.
Jerrold Levinson describes It as the 'widespread consensus' that a
mUSICal work is a 'variety of abstract object,' whose instances 'can be
found in the individual performances of the work'.' This view of the
ontological status of mUSICal works, to which I shall refer as Musical
Platonism, is the topic of this essa~,
My aim is twofold. Firstly, I intend to unveil the often implicit
role played by Musical Platonism in the considerations proposed in
the literature on the ontology of music. It will turn out that the
Musical Platonist stance Influences nor only the arguments of self-
proclaimed Platonlsts, such as Peter Kivy, but also the theses pro-
posed by philosophers of seemingly different philosophical persua-
sion. In section two of this paper, I discuss the importance of
MUSICal Platonist assumptions in a popular argumentative pattern,
which infcrs results about a work's ontological make-up from facts
pertaining to the correctness of its performances. As an example, I
focus on some aspects in the controversy between Levinson and Kivy
on the importance of performing means. In section three. I turn to
the widely accepted notion that the range of objects relevant for the
inquiry into the ontological status of musical works should be limited
to the prototypical examples of relatively recent Western 'serious'
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music, i.e., to the products of cultural settings in which the concept
of a musical work plays a central aesthetic role.
As the tirle of this paper may suggest, my description of the per-
vasive role played by Musical Platonism is not neutral. Indeed, my
second aim is that of casting some doubts on the tenability (or at
least the inevitability) of the Platonist standpoint in the ontology of
music. Although I do not present knock down counter-arguments, I
hope to convince the reader that, far from providing a well estab-
lished and intuitively convincing approach, Musical Platonism is at
best an unargued and questionable hypothesis.
I. The Road to Musical Platonism
The view that there are musical works is a primafacie plausible tenet.
In particular, it provides a natural account of the fact that we com-
monly talk as it" there are musical works. for Instance when we appar-
ently attribute to them properties such as that of being composed by
Brahms. or of being representative of the late Romantic tradition.
The acceptance of this position provokes questions concerning the
ontological nature of musical works. One result that appears to be
fairly conclUSIvely established is that a musical work may not be iden-
tified with any of its performances. There are at least two argumen-
tative strategies supporting this conclusion. The first employs the
premise that, for some property P, a performance of a work. but not
the work itself, has (or lacks) P. For instance, a performance of a
work, but not the work Itself, takes place at a certain time and in a
certain location. It follows by Leibniz's Law that the work IS distinct
from that performance. This result may then be generalized to the
conclusion that, given any performance of a work, it may not be iden-
tified with the work itself. Arguments of the second type appeal to
the principle of transitivity of identity. In particular, Nicholas
Wolterstorff argues that, given two distInct performances PI and P2
of a work w. w may not be identical to both. Hut the identification of
w with one of them, say PI' entails that P2• which is a performance of
w, is also a performance of PI' And the idea of a performance of a
performance. Wolterstorff claims. 'is impossible'.:
The relatively well established result that a musical work is dis-
tinct from any of its performances is usually taken as sufficient for
the further conclusion that it must be an abstract object. ThIS step is
not inevitable, given that entities distinct from performances may
nevertheless be concrete items. It may however be pointed out that
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performances are the only eonere!a with at least some initial claim to
the status of musical work, and that, in the absence of other plausible
candidates, the foregoing arguments suffice to support the thesis
that musical works are abstract entities. This thesis is the character-
istic claim of what I call Musical Realism, in conformity to the
common use of the label 'Realism' as denoting positions committed
to the existence of abstract entities.
The prima facie plausible views of the Musical Realist typically
provide the springboard to a stronger, and less immediately plausible
tenet, namely the theSIS that a musical work is an abstract entity of a
special kind: it is an instantiable entity, i.e., a universal. This position
is not equivalent to Musical Realism, given that universals form a
proper subclass of the set of abstract entities: uncontroversially,
certain abstract objects, such as sets, numbers, or propositions, are
not instantiable entities. The passage from Levinson, quoted at the
beginning of this paper, is unequivocally committed to the univer-
salist standpoint, as IS Peter Kivy's claim that 'musical works are uni-
versals, or types, or kinds, and the performances of them are particu-
lars, or tokens, or instances'.' Moreover, this position is further
enriched by Kivy and Levinson WIth another important assertion,
namely the thesis that the performances of a work are instances of it
(or, at least, the claim that they are importantly related to its
instances-more on this caveat later). The thesis that a mUSICal work
is a universal, instantiated by its performances, is the trademark of
Musical Platonism (hereinatter also simply 'Platonism').
Why should one subscribe to Musical I>latonism? At one pOlOt,
Kjv)' declares that its advantages are 'obvious', a confidence counter-
balanced by the admission of being 'neither confident, nor altogether
happy' in adhering to It.' In fact, the step from Musical Realism to
Platonism is neither immediate nor prima facie convlOcing. The evi-
dence which a Musical Realtst needs to take into account is the
apparent eXIstence of an interesting relationship between certain
abstract entities, the musical works, and Items of a different kind,
namely the events we tend to regard as those works' performances.
Hut it seems to be questionable (to say the least) that the only plau-
sible candidate for such an account is the model provided by the rela-
tionship between universals and their instances. Indeed, although
arguments in tavor at J'vlusical Platonism are nowhere to be found in
the recent Itterature on the subJcct, the reason for this lack of
support does not lie in the conviction that it is an uncontentious and
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self-evident position, but rather in the belief that the task has already
been satisfactorily carried out:
'Why Platonize music?' I cannot answer this question
here and now; and, quite frankly, I do not know if I could
even answer it anv better than it has already been bv such
elegant practitioners as Wollheim and WolterstorfC
It is however far from clear that the 'elegant practitioners' did indeed
provide an answer to Kivy's legitimate 'why'. Within a single para-
graph, Wollheim directly moves from the premise that musical works
are not physical objects to the conclusIOn that they are entities
instantiated by their performances:
once it is conceded that certain works of art are not phys-
ical objects, the subsequent problem that arises. whIch can
he put by asking, What sort of things arc they? is essen-
tially a logIcal problem. It IS that of determining the cn-
teria of identIty and individuation appropriate to. say. a
piece of music or a novel. I shall characrerize t he status of
such things bv saying that thev are ... types . ... In other
words. Ulysses and Der Rosenkavalier arc types. my copy of
Ulysses and tonight'S performance of Rosenkavalier arc
tokens of those types:
Similarly, Wolterstorff, immediately after having presented argu-
ments against the identification of a work with its performances,
merely states the characteristic tenet of Musical Platonism:
A performance of a work of art is an occurrence of it ... .
Most if not all occurrence-works are universals. In that
they can have multiple occurrences.'
Wollheim and Wolterstorff may well be entitled to develop more
or less detailed versions of the PlatonIst approach to musical works,
even in the absence of convinCing arguments endorsing their conclu-
sions. We, on the other hand, should be careful not to confuse con-
siderations favouring at best the Musical Realist stance with reasons
for embracing the Platonist paradigm. In particular, if my analysis
thus far is correct, the initial plausibility of MUSIcal Realism does not
suffice as a justification for the confidence with which Musical Pla-
tonism has entered the contemporary debate on mUSICal ontology.
In the next sections of this paper, I focus on certain important
consequences stemming from the assumption of MUSICal PlatoOlsm.
Before I turn to thiS task, however, I wish to clarify the caveat I left
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unexplained a few paragraphs ago, namely the idea that, In certain
versions of Musical Platonism, the performances of a work do not
instantiate it, but are nevertheless importantly related to that work's
instances. In particular, what I have in mind are two recent positions
which propose a distinction between performances and instances,
but which, in my view, still fit squarely within the Platonist paradigm.
The first is Levinson's, which suggests that we identifY the instances
of a work with a subclass of its performances, namely with its correct
performances.' The other is Gregory Currie's, which holds that a
work is an 'action type', consisting (among other things) of a sound
structure and a 'heuristic', and instantiated by a certain event
involving the work's composer:' Both positions qualifY as Platonist
for my purpose In this essay, since in both ot them the class of per-
formances of a work is defined, one way or another, in terms of the
instances of the universal element constitutive of the ontological
structure of the work. According to the former suggestion, a per-
formance of a work is a sound event appropriately related to an
instance i of that work (e.g., one which sufficiently approximates 1).
According to the latter, a performance of a work must instantiate an
element In the make-up of that work. i.e., the sound structure con-
tained in the n-tuple with which the work is identified. As Currie
puts it, a performance of a work involving a sound structure 5 'instan-
tiates the event type playing ofsound structure 5'. that is to say, 'the
work's pattern or structure'.'"
z. The Ontological Grounding ofPerformance Criteria
With or without the ahove mentioned epicycles. Musical Platonism
entails an important, debatable result, namely the thesis that the
class of a work's (correct) performances is determined by the onto-
logical make-up of that work. Suppose for example that we agree that
a musical work is a mere sound-structure (or. in Currie's case, contains
such a structure). Uncontroversially. it it is granted that sound-struc-
tures are universal items, it follows that the instances of the work at
issue (or the instances of the relevant clement in the n-tuple repre-
senting it) are only sound-events which exempli fy that structure.
Given the Platonist thesis that a work's performances (or, in
Levinson's case. correct performances) are its instances, it may be
concluded that only exemplars of the structure at issue may qualIfy as
that work's (correct) performances. Had we settled on a different
ontological picture of musical works. other criteria ot correctness
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would have emerged on the basis of the Platonist interpretation of a
work's correct performances as its instances. I refer to this conse-
quence of Musical Platonism as the ontological grounding of perform-
ance criteria. This intimate connection between performance criteria
and the ontological make-up of the work is particularly explicit in
Steven Davies' discussion of the concept of authenticity. For instance,
he writes that 'theories of musical ontology should tell us the type and
range of properties which must be produced in an authentic perform-
ance of a work', and that 'what we require from an authentic perform-
ance of the work is a performance whIch ... truly represents that in
virtue of which the work is the individual which it is'."
The relationship between the ontological constitution of a work
and the class of its correct performances, as described in the prin-
ciple of ontological grounding, is typically exploited by Musical Pla-
tonists in terms of arguments leading from certain intuitions about
what counts as a correct performance of a work, to conclusions per-
taining to its ontological nature. For instance, in this framework, the
notion that any correct performance of a work w must begin with a
certain pitch, produced by a certain instrument, Indicates that w
itself is the kind of universal instantiated by sound events of this
type, i.e., roughly, that it is (at Icast) a structure of pitch sequences
paIred with instrument indications. In a footnote to a passage which
identifies a work's instances and its correct performances, Levinson
makes this kind of transition apparent:
If instrumentation ... IS definitive of what a mrrect perform-
ance amounts to. thiS means that rcqutrlng proper Instru-
mentatIon IS essential to the kmo. and constitutive of It."
The Platonist strategy of Inferring metaphYSIcal conclusions from
premises about performance criteria is at work In one of the promi-
nent debates on musical ontology, that berween Kivy and LeVinson
on the importance of instrument indlCatiom for 'fully notated clas-
sical compositions of Western culture'." In a nutshell, Kivy holds
that musical works of this kind are mere sound structures, and
Levinson objects that they arc at least as complex as structures of
sounds and performance-means (in Levinson's termInology, S/PM
structures). In his essay 'Orchestrating Plalonlsn1, KIV:-' challenges
Levinson's proposal by citIng a variety of works, WIth respect to
which indicatIOns of performance-means arl' apparently Inessential."
For instance, we are told that Gabrieli's Cml':,ol/(/ per sonar may be exe-
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cuted by 'any combination of Instruments capable of realizing its
sound structure', that sound events produced by a modern Steinway
may count as performances of Bach's \Vell-Tempered Clavier, and that
performances of Mozart's 40th symphony with or without clarinets
are performances of one and the same work. Levinson counters that
no sound events issuing from a 'versatile synthesizer' may count as
performances of Beethoven's QUintet op. t6, and that no musician
operating 'a computer or some novel string Instrument using nonvio-
linistic technique' may perform Paganini\ Caprice Op.l, no.17."
In the absence of an independent Justification for the Platonist's
endorsement of the ontological grounding of performance criteria, the
arguments adduced by Kivy and Levinson in favour of their contrasting
views in musical ontology arc inconclusive. For if one rejects the Pla-
tonist interpretation of performances as instances of a work/universal,
the conflicting evidence provided by either Kivy or levinson fails to
support any conclusion pertaining to the ontological make-up of the
works at issue. Suppose for instance that. as Kivy insists, a sound event
resulting from appropriately operating a modern Steinway may count
as a performance, perhaps even a correct performance, of Rach's V?ell
7empered Cla·l!ier. Couldn't it still be the case that Bach's work is a
Levinsonian structure, i.e., a complex consisting, among other things,
of instrument indICations (say, the indication that it be performed by
some keyboard Instrumcnt of a type commonly used in Europe around
1730)? It could, If. contra MUSICal Platonism, onc assumes that the cri-
teria for correctly performing a piece of that kind aIlow the performer
to disregard that particular aspect of the work's ontological make-up,
In a non-Platonist view In this spIrit, Bach's work may well be a Levln-
son ian S/Pi\·\ structure, but the cvents which are accepted as correct
performances of It do not belong to the class of that structure's
instances. Supposc on the othcr h:md that one ~rants Levinson that a
sound event which perfectl~' instantiates the sound structure of
Beethoven's op. 16 may not count as a performance of that work if it is
produced hy a syntheSizer. Couldn't it be the case that the Quintct
under diSCUSSIon is constituted only hy that sound structure, in the
spirit of KI\'Y's theor~'? It could, it: contravening the Platonist stance,
we agrec that a correct performance of fieethoven's work ought to
conform to the composer's indications of Instrumentation, regardless
of the irrelevance of such indIcations for the ontological make-up of
the work.
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J. History and Ontology
It seems undeniable that, even within the boundaries of 'fully
notated classical compositions of Western culture', alternative cri-
teria of performance correctness are operative in different historical
periods and cultural traditions. This is a point which both Kivy and
Levinson concede, even though they belittle its significance by
accounting for it in terms of occasional deviations from what they
believe to be the norm. Levinson, who champions the thesis that
works are S/PM structures, labels works like Bach's Art ofthe Fugue,
where no performance-means appear to be indicated, as 'the excep-
tion that proves the rule'.lh Kivy, who analyses compositions as pure
sound structures, insists that works for which instrumental indica-
tions are essential are 'rare'." Such an analysis of recalcitrant cases as
'rare exceptions' has important metaphysical consequences, once the
Platonist stance is accepted. For if the Art ofthe Fugue may be cor-
rectly performed without regard for performance-means, and if
correct performances of it are instances of the universal with which
it is identified, it must follow that the Art ofthe Fugue is not a struc-
ture consisting, among other things, of indications of performance-
means. Similarly, if Mahler's symphonies (to pick a plausible candi-
date for Kivy's 'rare' instances) may be correctly performed only by
ensembles appropriately involving 'odd members of the horn family',
it follows from Musical Platonism that such works may not be con-
ceived of as mere sound-structures. Thus, regardless of which side
one takes in the debate between Kivy and Levinson, it seems to be a
consequence of Platonism (together with certain plausible views of
what it takes to perform the Art of the Fugue and a symphony by
Mahler) that the tradition of Western fully notated 'serious' music is
populated by objects belonging to importantly distinct ontological
types. This is a conclusion which Stephen Davies explicitly draws in
his essay 'The Ontology of Musical Works and the Authenticity of
their Performances';
Ihe totalirv of musical works from culture to culture and
from time to time do not have any single ontological
character I'
Davies' result is an outcome naturally emerging from the conjunc-
tion of the Platonist principle of ontological grounding with two rela-
tively plausible theses: the conviction that musical works are pro-
duced within a variety of cultural and aesthetic contexts, and the real-
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Ization that little agreement is to be found across such contexts
regarding what matters for correctly performing those works. It is a
conclusion which amounts to the admission that no interesting uni-
vocal metaphysical result concerning a certain kind of objects, those
we commonly call musical works, is to be expected from a Platonist
approach, and that the philosophical conclusions derivable from such
an approach may at best echo in an ontological jargon independently
established aesthetic tenets regarding performance criteria.
Another approach has however been pursued as an alternative to
Davies' ontological pluralism. Some have argued that musical works
exist only as products of a relatively well defined, possibly fairly
recent tradition, and that only cultural imperialism motivates our
inclination to subsume under the label of 'work' types of musical
activity belonging to different cultural contexts. Thus restricted, the
range of musical works may turn out to be ontologically homog-
enous, and apparent counter-examples may be relegated to a conven-
Ient metaphysical limbo. An attitude of this kind may for instance
motivate Levinson's announcement that he had 'no pretension to
arrive at an analysis general enough to accommodate music before,
say, 1750'.'" Even Kiv)', who apparently has a different idea trom
Levinson on what constitutes a prototypical musical work, writes
that he intends his results to concern the 'most valued art music of
the West', even though they 'may not be true for most of the world's
musIC'.'" So, apart from the question whether the Art ofthe Fugue or
Mahler's symphonies should fall within or without the range of para-
digmatic musical works, there seems to be a Widespread attraction to
the view that a particular context, defined in cultural and aesthetic
terms, constrains the class of items of interest to the musical meta-
physician. A common choice for such a context, though clearly not
the only plausible one, focuses on the emergence, hegemon~; and
development ot the Romantic aesthetic attitude, during the last two
centuries in the history of Western music.
Note that Levinson's determination to concentrate on the
Romantic and post-Romantic tradition, and Kivy's broader concern
for 'valued art music of the West', may not be interpreted as Innocent
and unassaJ1able decisions to focus one's field of inquiry. Given that
the issue is that of determining the ontological profile of a musical
work, any arbitrary restrictIon of the class of relevant examples may
yield unreliable and biased conclusions, comparable with the results
one may reach, were one to develop a description of, say, the canis
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!amiliaris, based solely on the observation of Labrador retrievers. In
fact, the view that musical ontology ought to focus on (a privileged
subclass of) the works of relatively recent, 'serious' Western music, is
typically presented not as the sheer result of one's whimsical predilec-
tions, but as the outcome of certain important historical and aesthetic
considerations. Particularly telling in this respect is a footnote to
'What a Musical Work Is Again', in which Levinson Justifies his bias
for the creations of the last two centuries by endorsing Lydia Goehr's
claim that 'the very concept of a musical work does not jell, docs not
exist completely in recognizable fashion, until around 1800'"'' In
Goehr's framework, this thesis is developed into the radical conclu-
sion that musical activity taking place in cultural contexts deprived of
the concept of a mUSICal work results in the mere production of
'ephemeral' sound events, and is unable to yield any enduring work at
aiL.'.' In other words, according to this approach, it is only recent
musical practice which generates exemplars of the relevant ontolog-
ical kind, thereby providmg a strong motivation for the decision to
base one's analysis of the ontological status of musical works simpliciter
on the features characterIStIC of relatively late products.
This strategy sacntlces generality in favour of ontological unifor-
mity: according to it, most of what we would pre-theoretically think
of as a musical work rums out to be nothmg of the sort, but, in
exchange, the class of musical works may plausibly be interpreted as
falling under a uniform metaphysical type. Clearly, the success of
such a programme IS In part dependent upon the plausibilIty of the
surprisingly narrow time span within which cultural practice is recog-
nized as governed by the concept of a musical work. But it is not this
premise of the argument embedded In the foregOing considerations
that is Important for my purpose in this essay. What is most inter-
esting here is rather the fundamental step involved in the argumenta-
tive pattern sketched above: for it is far from obvious that if the
concept of a musical work is not recognized as regulative in a certain
cultural setting, then mUSICal activity produced in that setting does
not result In the production of objects falling under Ihat concept. The
fact that this controverSial transition is typically taken for granted is
a testimony of the unJustltlcd contldence with whIch the Platonist
paradigm has been welcomed. In the absence of the very Idea of a
musical work, so one ma~' argue, musical practice may not be regu-
lated by the ideal of 'fidelity to the work', that is to say, by criteria
that define a class of sound events as a class of 'same-work perform-
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ances'. And if a cultural tradition does not so regulate musical prac-
tice, then it may be safely concluded that there are no standards of
correctness governing that praerice at all. But if there are no per-
formance-criteria operative in the cultural context under discussion,
it follows from the Platonist stance that no musical works may be
produced by musical aerivities within that tradition. For if there were
works, according to a Platonist, they would be universals determining
a class of sound events as correer performances, i.e., they would be
entities carrying standards of correctness within their very meta-
physical constitutIOn.
4. Conclusion
In the first section of this paper, I distinguished the dominant
approach to the ontology of music, which I called Musical Platonism,
from the prima facie plausible hypothesis of Musical Realism. Unlike
Realism, Platonism does not enjoy the methodological privilege of
pre-theoretical attractivity: although it is undeniable that musical
works bear an important relationship to events of a certain kind, their
performances, it is by no means obvious that such a relationship ought
to be explained by bestowing works with the status of instantiable
universals. Yet such a controversial and questionable assumption has
come to occupy a central role in the contemporary debate on musical
ontology without any conVincing argumentative strateh')' in its favour.
As I explained in the subsequent sections of this paper, the
research programme stemming from such an unwarranted conjecture
has proven to be remarkably unfruitful from the ontologist'S point of
view. It is true that the Platonist focus on performance criteria has
called the philosopher's attention to a variety of Interesting musico-
logICal issues, such as the study of musical praerices in different his-
torical and aesthetic settings, and the analysis of the regulatory role
played within these practices by certain aesthetic concepts.
However, there IS little the metaphysician of a Platonist persuasion
may add to the conclusions reached by the musicologist and the cul-
tural hlstonan, except for a rather uninformative rephrasing of such
results in the terminology of traditional ontology: given the inde-
pendently motivated thesis that any correct performance of a given
work 'It' must conform to certain properties l's, all we are entitled to
infer in virtue of the Platonist's commitment to the principle of
ontological grounding IS the not so startlmg conclusion that w is the
kind of structure whose instances must bear the Ps. In other words,
[7
Literature andAesthetics
as a result of the Musical Platonist paradigm, the initially promising
programme of investigating the ontological constitution of musical
works is abandoned in favor of the important but metaphysically less
urgent analysis of the relationships existing between works and their
performances. Not surprisingly, whenever such an approach is
coupled with the discovery of a variety of performance criteria oper-
ative in different historical contexts, it yields either Davis' admission
that the class of musical works fails to provide a metaphysically
interesting kind, or Goehr's contention that such a kind at best con-
tains a dramatically restncted list of specimens. In either case, the
Musical Realist project of unveiling the interesting ontological fea-
tures of those objects we commonly regard as musical works has
been abandoned.
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